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17 
Corruption and College Sports:  
A Love Story 
 
by Andrea Cristiani Closa1 
 
Abstract 
College sports are a staple of American tradition, bringing in hundreds 
of millions of viewers each year.  Fans from all over the country root for 
their team’s success and hope they will be the ones to take home the national 
championship each year.  Increasingly, however, college sports have been in 
the public eye for a very different reason: corruption.  The National 
Collegiate Athletics Association’s (“NCAA”) Amateurism Rule, which 
prohibits student-athletes from receiving compensation, has contributed to 
this ongoing corruption.  The NCAA insists upon its student-athletes 
remaining amateurs, even though its own rule is damaging the integrity of 
college sports.  Players, coaches, and fans alike are yearning for change.  
Nevertheless, the NCAA does not waiver from its Amateurism Rule. 
If this corruption is to end, however, something must change.  The 
NCAA has to let go of its archaic rule and allow student-athletes to receive 
compensation.  Or, as an alternative, courts have to refuse to allow the 
NCAA to hide behind its Amateurism Rule and hold it accountable under 
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  Either way, if the NCAA wants the 
endemic corruption to end, the only solution is to allow student-athletes to 
receive compensation.  Although legal issues arise from student-athletes 
receiving compensation directly from their colleges and universities, 
allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and receive 









 1.  J.D. Candidate 2020, University of California Hastings College of the Law 
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Introduction 
On September 26, 2017, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
arrested ten people, including four college basketball assistant coaches, as 
part of an investigation into bribes(pay-for-play2) and other corruption3 
occurring in college athletics.4  As part of the investigation, Louis Martin 
Blazer III, working as a cooperating witness for the FBI, recorded Auburn 
University’s assistant coach Chuck Person accepting a $50,000 bribe from 
Blazer in order to compel student-athletes on Auburn’s basketball team to 
retain Blazer’s business management services.5  The resulting criminal 
complaint further alleged that University of Louisville’s head coach Rick 
Pitino, one of college basketball’s most successful coaches, was suspended 
for failing to supervise former staff member Andre McGee, “who allegedly 
arranged for strip dances or sex acts for three players, fifteen recruits and 
two coaches.”6 
One year later, on October 24, 2018, a jury convicted three of those 
arrested in the pay-for-play sting7 on felony charges of wire fraud and 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.8  The NCAA also stripped Rick Pitino and 
the University of Louisville Cardinals of four years of tournament wins, 
including their 2013 national championship win.9 
Ever since its founding in 1906, the National Collegiate Athletics 
Association (“NCAA”) has centered around the concept of amateurism.10  Its 
current mission statement includes an exhortation that “[s]tudent-athletes 
 
 2.  Pay-to-play, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition 
/pay-to-play (last visited Feb. 28, 2019) (Relating to or denoting a situation in which payment 
is demanded, often illegally, from those wishing to take part in a particular business activity). 
 3.  Corruption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com 
/dictionary/corruption (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (Corruption is defined as “inducement to 
wrong by improper or unlawful means.”). 
 4.  Mark Schlabach, The step-by-step process of how the words ‘corruption’ and 
‘fraud’ came to college basketball, ESPN (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.espn.com/mens-coll 
ege-basketball/story/_/id/20834050/the-story-how-fbi-brought-words-corruption.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Mark Schlabach, James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in 
pay-for-play trial, ESPN (Oct. 24, 2018), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball 
/story/_/id/25072946/james-gatto-merl-code-christian-dawkins-found-guilty-college-basketb 
all-pay-play-trial.  
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Richard Johnson, Louisville loses NCAA appeal and becomes the 1st men’s 
basketball program to have an NCAA banner taken down, SBNATION (Feb. 21, 2018, 8:31 
PM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/2/20/17032440/louisville-basketba 
ll-2013-title-banner-stripped-taken-down.   
 10.  Patrick McDevitt, The NCAA’s Amateurism Rules are Indeed Madness, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2018, 5:47 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-
mcdevitt-ncaa-amateurism_us_5a987314e4b0479c0250a58d.  
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shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should 
be motivated primarily by education and by physical, mental and social 
benefits derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an 
avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by 
professional and commercial enterprises.”11  The NCAA’s conceptualization 
of amateurism is rooted in student-athletes’ playing and practicing without 
compensation.12  Under the current NCAA rules, of course, student-athletes 
may and do receive compensation in the form of tuition, room, and travel 
expenses.13  However, student-athletes may not receive salaries or 
endorsement deals, and NCAA rules prohibit them from working with sports 
agents.14 
The NCAA only prohibits student-athletes from profiting off of college 
sports.  In 2017, the NCAA made $1 billion in revenue, while student-
athletes made no on-the-books revenue.15  According to the NCAA’s 
expense sheet, half of this revenue was distributed back to Division I schools, 
but none of the revenue went directly to the players whose labor and 
intellectual property generated the money.16 
This stark imbalance has led to a culture where college athletes are 
receptive to under-the-table compensation (and bribes) that are technically 
against the NCAA’s rules and, in some cases, against the law.  College 
coaches and sports agents understand that college sports are a lucrative 
market from which student-athletes deserve to benefit.  As a result, several 
college coaches have begun paying student-athletes in pay-for-play 
schemes—in other words, bribery to induce student-athletes to commit to a 
certain university.17  The widespread corruption in collegiate athletics is a 
direct result of the NCAA’s ham-fisted and unrealistic Amateurism Rule. 
The NCAA will only change its Amateurism Rule if mechanisms exist 
to hold it accountable for the rule’s harmful side effects.  Part I of this Note 
will look in depth at the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletics Ass’n,18 where former NCAA student-athletes brought 
antitrust challenges to NCAA’s compensation rules.19  The court in 
 
 11.  The Principle of Amateurism, NCAA 2018-2019 DIVISION I MANUAL.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at 202-03; 233-34. 
 14.  Id at 63-64.   
 15.  Alex Kirshner, Here’s how the NCAA generated a billion dollars in 2017, 
SBNATION (Mar. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/2018/3/8/17092300/ncaa-re 
venues-financial-statement-2017. 
 16.  Id. (According to the NCAA’s 2017 financial statement, $817,517,801 of its $1 
billion total revenue came from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament).  
 17.  James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins found guilty in pay-for-play trial, 
supra note 7.  
 18.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 19.  Id. at 1055.  
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O’Bannon reasoned that the NCAA is subject to antitrust challenges, and 
held that the NCAA must allow student-athletes to be paid up to the full cost 
of attendance in order to be in compliance with the Sherman Antitrust Act.20  
The court stated that amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive purpose;21 
this determination has allowed the NCAA to hide behind its Amateurism 
Rule when faced with antitrust challenges.  Part II will discuss the NCAA’s 
Amateurism Rule and why it should be abolished.  This part will dive into 
the benefits and detriments of the NCAA’s Amateurism Rule and 
demonstrate specific ways in which it is leading to corruption in colleges and 
universities.  Finally, Part III will outline practical solutions to the problems 
caused by the NCAA’s refusal to appropriately compensate its athletes, 
including changing NCAA’s rules in order to allow student-athletes to accept 
endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their name, 
image, and likeness. 
 
O’Bannon v. NCAA and NCAA’s Amateurism Rule 
The NCAA requires all of its student-athletes to be amateurs in order to 
be eligible to play sports.22  The NCAA defines a professional athlete as “one 
who receives any kind of payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics 
participation . . . .”23  Further, payment is defined as “the receipt of funds, 
awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the 
Association for participation in athletics.”24  In other words, in the eyes of 
the NCAA, the difference between an amateur and a professional athlete is 
the receipt of payment.  Under the NCAA’s current rules, student-athletes 
are allowed to receive compensation for “actual and necessary expenses.”25  
These expenses include things such as: lodging, meals, apparel, equipment, 
health insurance, transportation, etc.26  However, these “actual and necessary 
expenses” may be provided only if such expenses are for competition on a 
team, for a specific event, or for practice that is “directly related” to a 
competition.27  The NCAA does pay for expenses related to sports events, 
but, if a student-athlete accepts or promises to accept any form of payment 
that is not “actual and necessary,” then the student-athlete will lose their 
amateur status and be ineligible to play.28 
 
 20.  Id. at 1075-76.  
 21.  Id. at 1073.  
 22.  Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility, NCAA 2018-2019 DIVISION I MANUAL. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility, supra note 22.  
 28.  Id.  
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Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”) prohibits 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations.”29  But the Sherman Act prevents only “unreasonable 
restraints of trade.”30  There are two standards used to determine whether 
there has been an unreasonable restraint of trade: the rule of reason and the 
per se rule.31  Restraints on compensation (like those challenged in 
O’Bannon32) are usually analyzed under the rule of reason standard.33 
The rule of reason restraint of trade analysis entails a three-step inquiry.  
First, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the restraint on trade 
causes significant anticompetitive effects on a relevant market.34  If the 
plaintiff meets that burden, the defendant must produce evidence of the 
restraint’s “procompetitive effects.”35  The burden then shifts back on the 
plaintiff to show that any legitimate objective can be achieved through a 
substantially less restrictive alternative.36  To be viable, an alternative means 
must be virtually as effective in serving the procompetitive purposes, without 
significantly increasing cost.37 
In O’Bannon, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the issue of 
whether the NCAA’s rules prohibiting the compensation of athletes were 
subject to federal antitrust laws, and, if so, whether the rules constituted an 
unlawful restraint of trade.38  In this case, O’Bannon, a former University of 
California Los Angeles (“UCLA”) basketball player, sued the NCAA 
arguing that the NCAA’s rule prohibiting compensation of student athletes 
for the use of their names, images, and likenesses (“NILs”) constituted an 
illegal restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.39  The NCAA, 
in response, made three key arguments.  First, the NCAA, relying on dicta, 
argued that the Supreme Court in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma and Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass’n,40 held 
that the NCAA’s Amateurism rule is “valid as a matter of law.”41  Second, 
the NCAA argued that its compensation rules were not subject to the 
 
 29.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 30.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. and Univ. of 
Ga. Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).   
 31.  Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).  
 32.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. at 1070. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. (citing Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
 37.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074. 
 38.  Id at 1052.  
 39.  Id.at 1055.  
 40.  468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).   
 41.  Id.  
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Sherman Act because the rules did not regulate commercial activity.42  
Lastly, the NCAA argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring suit 
because they did not suffer antitrust injury.43 
First, the NCAA asserted that any antitrust challenge to its Amateurism 
Rule must fail as a matter of law, because the Supreme Court in Board of 
Regents had held the Amateurism Rule was presumptively valid.44  The 
Ninth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the Court in Board of Regents did not 
categorically endorse the NCAA’s Amateurism Rule as being consistent 
with the Sherman Act.45  Rather, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, Board of 
Regents stood for the proposition that no NCAA rule should be invalidated 
without conducting a rule of reason analysis because NCAA’s rules 
(including its Amateurism Rule) were a part of the “character and quality of 
the [NCAA’s] product.”46  The Ninth Circuit went on to opine that the 
Court’s dicta in Board of Regents supports the preservation of amateurism 
in college sports because amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive purpose 
the NCAA can pursue.47  The Court in Board of Regents states that it is 
reasonable to assume that NCAA’s regulatory controls “are justifiable means 
of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore 
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate 
athletics.”48  However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[n]othing in Board 
of Regents supports [the notion that the rule of reason was exempt from an 
antitrust challenge].”49  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Amateurism 
Rule’s procompetitiveness did not automatically make the Amateurism Rule 
lawful, as a restraint found to be procompetitive can still be unlawful under 
a rule of reason analysis if a substantially less restrictive rule would further 
the same objectives.50  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the NCAA’s 
Amateurism Rule was not exempt from antitrust challenges: “[t]he 
amateurism rules’ validity must be proved, not presumed.”51 
The NCAA’s second argument was that its compensation rules were not 
subject to the Sherman Act because they were “mere eligibility rules,” and 
therefore did not regulate commercial activity.52  The Ninth Circuit began its 
analysis of this issue by looking at the definition of commerce, which it 
 
 42.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061. 
 43.  Id.   
 44.  Id. at 1063.  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102).  
 47.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.  
 48.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added).  
 49.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063. 
 50.  Id. at 1064.  
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id. at 1064-65.  
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defined as “every activity from which the actor anticipates economic gain.”53  
The court reasoned that, pursuant to this definition, “commerce” included a 
transaction where an athletic recruit exchanges his labor and NIL rights for 
a scholarship to a university because both sides expect an economic gain 
from the transaction.54  The court further reasoned that the NCAA’s 
compensation rules clearly regulated such transactions: a university may not 
give a recruit compensation beyond a scholarship, and a recruit may not 
accept compensation which is not sanctioned by the rules, or the recruit will 
be disqualified and the transaction vitiated.55  Therefore, according to the 
Ninth Circuit, NCAA’s compensation rules regulate commercial activity.56  
The mere fact that the NCAA characterizes its compensation rules as 
“eligibility rules,” does not mean the rule is not a restraint of trade subject to 
antitrust challenges.57  After observing that antitrust laws could not be 
avoided by “clever manipulation of words,”58 the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the NCAA’s compensation rules were within the Sherman Act’s reach.59 
The NCAA’s final argument was that the plaintiffs had no standing to 
bring suit because they had not suffered an antitrust injury.60  The NCAA 
contended that plaintiffs had not been “injured in fact” by its compensation 
rules because those rules do not deprive plaintiffs of compensation that they 
would otherwise receive.61  More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the 
NCAA’s rule prohibiting compensation of student-athletes for the use of 
their NILs (the only category of compensation at issue in the case) 
constituted an illegal restraint of trade.62  The district court had identified 
three potential markets for NIL rights: (i) live game broadcasts, (ii) video 
games, and (iii) game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archival 
footage.63  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were “injured in 
fact” as a result of the NCAA having foreclosed the market for the use of 
their NILs in video games.64  The court reasoned that, absent NCAA’s 
prohibitions, video game producers and other licensees, would negotiate 
 
 53.  Id. at 1065 (citing Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis 
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application (4th ed. 2013)). 
 54.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1964).  
 59.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1066. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 1067.  
 62.  Id. at 1055. 
 63.  Id. at 1067.  
 64.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067 (At the time of this litigation, the NCAA no longer 
permitted college sports video games to be made, and had a policy forbidding the use of 
student-athletes NILs in video games.). 
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with student-athletes for the right to use their NILs, just as licensees do with 
professional athletes.65  Therefore, the court concluded the plaintiffs had 
suffered an injury in fact, and subsequently had standing to bring the antitrust 
suit.66 
Having rejected all of NCAA’s primary arguments, the Ninth Circuit 
turned to the merits of plaintiffs’ antitrust claim and applied the rule of 
reason analysis.67  The Ninth Circuit first examined whether the plaintiffs 
had shown that restraint on trade caused significant anticompetitive effects 
on a relevant market.68  The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California found that a relevant market exists wherein universities 
compete for athletic recruits by offering them scholarships and amenities, 
such as talented coaching staff and state-of-the-art athletic facilities.69  
Further, the district court found that, but for NCAA’s compensation rules, 
universities would compete to offer athletic recruits compensation for their 
NILs and labor.70  The Ninth Circuit deferred to the district court’s findings 
of fact that the NCAA’s compensation rules had a “significant 
anticompetitive effect” on the relevant market because the rules fix the price 
that universities pay to secure athletic recruits.71  In other words, the NCAA’s 
compensation rules fix what universities may and may not “pay” to secure a 
recruit’s services.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that these findings had 
substantial support in the record, and therefore plaintiffs met their burden for 
the first step of the rule of reason analysis.72 
The Ninth Circuit then examined the second prong of rule of reason 
analysis: procompetitive effects of the at-issue behavior.73  The NCAA 
offered four procompetitive justifications for its compensation rules: (i) 
promoting amateurism, (ii) promoting competitive balance among 
universities, (iii) integrating student-athletes with their academic 
community, and (iv) increasing output in the college education market.74  
Once again, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the district court’s findings that the 
NCAA’s compensation rules did not promote a competitive balance among 
universities or increase output in the college education market, and the rules 
 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id.  
 67.  Id. at 1069.  
 68.  Id. at 1070.  
 69.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 1072.  
 73.  Id. at 1070.  
 74.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.  
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only played a limited role in the integration of student-athletes with their 
academic community.75 
With respect to the NCAA’s goal of promoting amateurism, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that a restraint could be procompetitive if the restraint 
broadened choices for consumers.76  The NCAA argued that amateurism 
increases choice for student-athletes because it gives them “the only 
opportunity [they will] have to obtain a college education while playing 
competitive sports as students.”77  However, the court reasoned that the 
restraint at issue in this case (NCAA’s limits on student-athlete 
compensation) did not affect choice, because a student-athlete’s choice of 
college would still be available if they were paid some compensation in 
addition to their scholarships.78  Namely, compensation beyond scholarships 
does not limit the number of colleges student-athletes may choose to attend.  
The Ninth Circuit therefore rejected the NCAA’s argument that its 
compensation rules increase the choices available to student-athletes.79  
Nevertheless, the district court found (and the Ninth Circuit agreed) that the 
NCAA’s Amateurism Rule had the procompetitive benefit of increasing the 
appeal of collegiate sports to consumers.80  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held 
that NCAA’s compensation rules serve two procompetitive purposes: 
integrating student-athletes with their academic community and “preserving 
the popularity of the NCAA’s product by promoting its current 
understanding of amateurism.”81 
The Ninth Circuit concluded its analysis by examining whether there 
were substantially less restrictive alternatives to the NCAA’s current 
compensation rules.82  To be viable, an alternative must be virtually as 
effective in serving procompetitive purposes, without significantly 
increasing the cost of the operative business model.83  The district court 
found there were two substantially less restrictive alternatives to the 
NCAA’s current compensation rules.84  First, the universities could be 
permitted to give student-athletes grants-in-aid that cover the full cost of 
attendance.85  Second, the NCAA could allow schools to pay student-athletes 
 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id.   
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id at 1072-73.   
 79.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 1074.  
 83.  Id.   
 84.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074. 
 85.  Id.  
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for the use of their NILs.86  The Ninth Circuit upheld the first alternative on 
the logic that allowing for up to the full cost of attendance would not frustrate 
the NCAA’s legitimate procompetitive purpose of amateurism.87  Such 
grants, after all, would still be tethered to education and, therefore, because 
the payment was indirect, student-athletes would still be considered 
amateurs.88  Therefore, the NCAA must allow colleges to pay for student-
athletes’ cost of attendance.89  The court, however, rejected the second 
alternative, reasoning that permitting universities to pay student-athletes for 
the use of the NILs is not as “equally effective” in promoting amateurism as 
forbidding them to be compensated for the use of their NILs.90  In other 
words, allowing student-athletes to be compensated for the use of their NILs 
would rid them of their amateur status. 
Chief Judge Thomas, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned that the majority 
misapplied the rule of reason analysis.91  He believes the proper inquiry 
should be “whether allowing student-athletes to be compensated for their 
NILs is ‘virtually as effective’ in preserving popular demand for college 
sports as not allowing compensation.”92  Chief Judge Thomas’ reasoning for 
this being the proper inquiry boils down to his disagreement with the 
majority’s opinion as to the procompetitive interests at stake.93  He believes 
that for purposes of antitrust analysis, amateurism is relevant only as it 
relates to consumer interest.94  Chief Judge Thomas reasoned that the 
plaintiffs are not required to show that the proposed alternatives are 
“virtually as effective” at preserving amateurism “as the NCAA chooses to 
define it.”95  “Indeed, this would be a difficult task, given that ‘amateurism’ 
has proven a nebulous concept prone to ever-changing definition.”96  The 
Chief Judge goes on to state that even today’s Amateurism Rule does not fall 
into a bright line rule between paying student-athletes and not paying them.97  
For example, while basketball and football players are not allowed to receive 
any compensation other than the full cost of attendance, a tennis player can 
 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. at 1075. 
 88.  Id. at 1075. 
 89.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059. 
 90.  Id. at 1076.  
 91.  Id. at 1081 (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
 92.  Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
 93.  Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
 94.  Id. at 1081 (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
 95.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1083 (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
 96.  Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
 97.  Id. (Thomas, S., dissenting). 
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earn up to $50,000 for playing his sport and still be considered an amateur 
by the NCAA.98 
The NCAA insists that fans will lose interest if student-athletes are paid.  
However, this assertion is contradicted by the district court’s findings, and 
by the NCAA’s own rules.99  The district court found evidence “suggests that 
consumer demand for FBS football and Division I basketball-related 
products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete compensation but 
instead by other factors, such as school loyalty and geography.”100  Further, 
the NCAA sold television rights to broadcast the NCAA men’s basketball 
tournament to CBS for twelve years for $10.8 billion.101  Yet, the NCAA 
insists that this multi-billion dollar industry would disappear if student-
athletes were compensated beyond the full cost of attendance.  This argument 
simply does not make sense given that student-athletes do receive stipends 
untethered to education, and college sports are more popular than ever.102 
The majority in O’Bannon concluded that allowing students to be 
paid—either by the NCAA or by third-party licensees—would take away 
their amateur status, which would strip the NCAA of their legitimate 
procompetitive purpose (i.e. the promotion of amateurism).  Yet, this 
reasoning essentially allows the NCAA to hide behind its own categorization 
of its Amateurism Rule in order to avoid violating the Sherman Act.  The 
court in O’Bannon failed to consider the harm that the Amateurism Rule 
causes to both student-athletes and the NCAA’s integrity.  O’Bannon’s 
reasoning enables the law and the NCAA to continue to overlook a simple 
truth: if the NCAA were to get rid of its Amateurism Rule, it would avoid 
antitrust challenges in the future because it would no longer be restraining 
trade with its rules against compensation.  The next part of this Note will 
discuss why the NCAA should get rid of its Amateurism Rule. 
 
The NCAA’s Amateurism Rule Should be Abolished 
There are two main reasons why the NCAA insists its student-athletes 
be amateurs—each deeply flawed.  First, the NCAA’s presumption that 
amateurism is an integral part of the success and popularity of collegiate 
sports is unfounded or, at the very least, outdated.103  The NCAA argues that 
fans “will lose interest in college sports if student-athletes are paid any 
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amount of money that is not tethered to educational costs.”104  This argument 
dates back to Justice Stevens’ dicta in Board of Regents: “[i]t is reasonable 
to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable 
means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore 
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate 
athletics.”105  Justice Stevens believed that NCAA’s Amateurism Rule 
created fan interest in college athletics.106  His comment has been a crutch 
for preserving the illusion of a pre-professional distinction.  However, there 
remains scant empirical evidence for Justice Steven’s assumption.  In fact, 
consumers are arguably attracted to college sports primarily for reasons 
unrelated to amateurism, such as loyalty to their alma mater or affinity for 
the university near where they grew up.107  Further, NCAA’s Amateurism 
Rule was not in controversy in Board of Regents; therefore, no market-based 
evidence108 was presented to defend this argument.109 
Moreover, this argument does not hold water after the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in O’Bannon, where the court held that the NCAA must allow 
colleges to pay for student-athletes’ cost of attendance.110  This cost of 
attendance also includes stipends, which range from $2,000 to $5,000 a year, 
with some schools offering a few thousand dollars more.111  These stipends 
are untethered to educational services universities and colleges provide to 
athletes.112  In other words, student-athletes are not required to spend their 
stipends on education-related purchases—the occasional slice of pizza or 
paying for their cell phone bill, for example.113  In addition to these stipends, 
the NCAA allows monetary awards it describes as “incidental to athletics 
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participation.”114  These monetary awards reward student-athletes for their 
participation and/or achievements in athletics, such as winning a national 
championship.115  A student-athlete on a team that won a national 
championship could receive a total of $5,600 simply for participating in a 
sport.116  Student-athletes have been receiving so-called cost of attendance 
stipends and monetary awards since 2015, and fan interest in college sports 
has not decreased over that time period.117 
In fact, evidence suggests that interest in certain college sports is 
increasing.  The 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament averages 11.3 
million viewers, an 8% increase from the previous year; it was the most 
watched NCAA tournament in twenty-two years.118  There is likewise scant 
evidence to suggest that fan support would decrease if student-athletes were 
allowed to accept endorsement deals or be compensated for the use of their 
NILs.  In fact, allowing student-athletes to monetize their NILs might 
increase fan interest.  The NCAA’s argument that its Amateurism Rule is an 
integral part of the success of college sports does not survive close scrutiny. 
The NCAA’s second justification for the Amateurism Rule is that 
amateurism allows student-athletes to receive an education that they may 
otherwise not.119  Basically, amateurism is the concept of being a student first 
and an athlete second.120  This is undoubtedly the strongest argument for the 
Amateurism Rule: 
In theory, at least, college sports provided an important opportunity for 
teaching people about character, motivation, endurance, loyalty, and the 
attainment of one’s personal best—all qualities of great value in citizens. In 
this sense, competitive athletics were viewed as an extracurricular activity, 
justified by the university as part of its ideal objective of educating the whole 
person.121 
Arguably, however, many Division I student-athletes do not consider 
the education component of college to be their first priority.  As Cardale 
Jones, an ex-Ohio State University football player, stated: “[w]hy should we 
have to go to class if we came here to play FOOTBALL, we ain’t come to 
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play SCHOOL, classes are POINTLESS.”122  Many student-athletes’ first 
priority is to play sports, evidenced by many student-athletes entering 
professional sports drafts when they are eligible, usually before finishing 
their degree.  In the 2017 National Basketball Association (“NBA”) draft, 
there were twenty players who had completed just one year of college.123  
Further, those student-athletes who do graduate usually graduate with 
degrees that may not prepare them adequately for a competitive job market 
or for post-graduate studies.124  For example, 51% of student-athletes on 
Baylor University’s football team are general studies majors, while only 1% 
of all other undergraduates are general studies majors.125  Student-athletes 
are “routinely clustered” into “easy” or less time-consuming majors so that 
they can focus on their athletics.126  Therefore, even though the NCAA 
argues that student-athletes are students first and athletes second, the 
evidence shows that this is fiction.  Student-athletes routinely prioritize their 
sport over their academics. 
The fact remains that while the NCAA defends the necessity of 
amateurism, NCAA’s particular definition and understanding of the concept 
of amateurism have changed over the years whenever it suits the NCAA’s 
needs.127  For example, the NCAA did not allow athletic scholarships until 
the 1950s, because scholarships were seen as a payment.128  The NCAA later 
decided that scholarships were not payments, and began allowing colleges 
to award them to student-athletes.129  In 2011, a university could be punished 
for providing student-athletes with textbooks.130  But as of 2015, universities 
can provide student-athletes with textbooks because textbooks are now 
considered part of the full cost of attending the university, which the NCAA 
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has lately deemed is acceptable.131  Before January 2015, universities were 
prohibited from providing travel services to parents of student-athletes 
because it was considered a form of payment, but now these services are 
officially classified as non-payment, and therefore allowed.132  As one 
reporter put it: 
 
It was . . . pay to provide an athlete with cream cheese on his 
bagel, and since pay is evil and cream cheese was pay, it appears 
cream cheese was evil.  But now . . . schools can give as much 
food as they want, which means food, even cream cheese, is no 
longer pay and this is no longer evil.133 
 
The idea that college athletics would somehow be sullied if the 
economics of the real world were allowed to impinge is also fiction.  Lots of 
people become very wealthy off of college sports, just not student-athletes.134  
For example, college coaches are some of the highest paid employees in the 
sports world.  In 2018, Duke University’s head coach, Mike Krzyewski, 
made $8.98 million,135 while Steve Kerr, who coached the Golden State 
Warriors to three NBA championships, made $5 million last year.136  “The 
commercial aspect of college athletics—television contracts and bowl game 
revenue, for example—counteracts the nonprofit, amateur motives of the 
organization.”137  The NCAA’s Amateurism Rule is in direct conflict with 
the presence of these economic objectives, yet the NCAA does not waiver 
from its purported amateurism ideals. 
 
The Benefits and Detriments of NCAA’s Amateurism Rule 
The NCAA’s practices with almost every party except student-athletes 
are inconsistent with its professed amateurism ethos.  Apart from the 
hypocrisy of allowing administrators, coaches, and the NCAA to exploit 
college athletes, there are several affirmative benefits to eliminating the 
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NCAA’s Amateurism Rule.  First, players may stay in college longer if they 
were compensated.138  College basketball is notorious for the “one-and-
done” rule, where players leave college after one year, coinciding with their 
eligibility to enter the NBA draft.  Even the NBA commissioner, Adam 
Silver, acknowledges that it is a problem, “[m]y sense is it’s not working for 
anyone . . . [i]t’s not working for the college coaches and athletic directors I 
hear from. They’re not happy with the current system.”139  A National 
Football League (“NFL”) executive also noted the problem: “[t]he college 
coaches are always on us about their kids leaving early, and I tell them, until 
you start paying them, they’re leaving.”140  Compensating student-athletes 
might be a solution to this problem, as students will be more willing to stay 
in college if they receive compensation.  “Athletes might well be more likely 
to attend college, and stay there longer, if they knew that they were earning 
some amount of NIL income while they were in school.”141 
Financial pressures at home are often so extreme that finishing college 
at the expense of beginning a professional sports career is untenable.  “Many 
of these athletes come from urban, lower-class families and often leave 
school early because of the unimaginable pressure to be the main provider 
of their family at a young age.”142  If student-athletes received compensation, 
then they could support their families while remaining in school to receive 
the college education that the NCAA wants them to receive.  LeBron James, 
a three-time NBA champion, expressed his concerns with the current system, 
“[m]e and my mom was poor, I’ll tell you that, and they expected me to step 
foot on a college campus and not go to the NBA? We weren’t going to be 
poor for long, I’ll tell you that. That’s a fact.”143  LeBron James did not attend 
college, as he was not required to do so when he entered the NBA draft in 
2003.144 
The next benefit of getting rid of the Amateurism Rule is that 
compensating student-athletes would reduce the amount of corruption now 
occurring in college sports.  Student-athletes are likely going to receive 
payment whether it is allowed or not.  By not allowing student-athletes to be 
paid, the NCAA is creating a market for illicit payments, and college coaches 
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have begun taking matters into their own hands and paying players as part of 
the recruitment process.145  This corruption will continue as long as the 
NCAA does not amend its amateurism values and allow student-athletes to 
be compensated in one form or another. 
There are of course a few detriments to compensating student-athletes.  
The first, and strongest argument, is the fear that student-athletes will be 
irresponsible with the money they earn.146  Most of Division I student-
athletes are aged eighteen to nineteen and likely have no money management 
skills.147  As sports commentator Colin Cowherd noted, “most 19-year-olds 
(are) gonna spend it—and let’s be honest, they’re gonna spend it on weed 
and kicks!”148  However, a solution to this problem may be to enroll student-
athletes in money-management skill courses.  Conveniently, the NCAA has 
begun to develop a program for student-athletes to learn such skills.149  “So 
the Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee has started developing 
a standardized program to teach athletes how to be fiscally responsible.”150  
Even without such a program, justifying a refusal to pay athletes by worrying 
about their future spending habits rings hollow.  Why should players not be 
able to spend the money they earn in the manner they wish? 
The second detriment to compensating student-athletes, is that any 
compensation system would result in salary differentials for players.151  Yet, 
while allowing student-athletes to take endorsement deals and receive 
compensation for the use of their NILs will create uneven compensation 
between student-athletes, this is acceptable because not all student-athletes 
generate as much money as others: 
In almost all cases, one or two sports dominate the merchandise, ticket 
sales, and publicity at any college—usually football, men’s basketball, and 
women’s basketball.  In those situations, it’s a stretch to say that the guys on 
the rugby team are owed the same money as the football players.152 
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Further, salary inequity amongst groups of players or teammates is not 
new to sports, as professional athletes get paid different salaries depending 
on their skill level, so there is no reason for college athletics to operate 
differently in this respect than literally every other professional sports 
league. 
The last detriment to compensating student-athletes, according to the 
NCAA, is that compensation “incentivizes athletics over academics.”153  
However, as argued earlier, many student-athletes already prioritize athletics 
over education.154  The NCAA has a rule where student-athletes must be 
academically eligible to play sports, i.e. student-athletes must maintain a 
certain grade point average (“GPA”) in order to be allowed to play their 
respective sport.155  The result of this rule tends to be a focus on eligibility 
rather than education.156  Due to this incentive system, most student-athletes 
opt for easy majors with a low time commitment in order to remain 
technically eligible to play sports.157  Such course and major gamesmanship 
hardly satisfies the spirit of the NCAA’s avowed rationale. 
The benefits of getting rid of NCAA’s Amateurism Rule outweigh its 
detriments. Nevertheless, the NCAA persists on its student-athletes 
remaining amateurs.  The problem, however, is that college sports are a 
lucrative market from which many people benefit, except student-athletes.  
College coaches and sports agents understand this and believe that student-
athletes deserve to benefit because they are the ones who make it lucrative.  
Several college coaches and sports agents have therefore taken the matter of 
player compensation into their own hands and begun paying student-athletes 
in pay-for-play schemes.  As a result, the Amateurism Rule has directly led 
to a rise in corruption at colleges and universities.  As one NFL executive 
stated, “[t]here’s so much money at the college level, and if the good guys 
aren’t gonna pay you, then the bad guys are.”158 
 
Corruption in College Sports 
Despite the NCAA’s high-minded philosophizing, money is very much 
a part of college athletics.  The NCAA’s rules ignore the economic realities 
and pressures many student-athletes face.  Accordingly, the rules have 
contributed to a thriving culture of corruption and under-the-table dealings.  
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On September 26, 2017, college basketball assistant coaches from the 
University of Arizona, Auburn University, University of Louisville, 
University of Miami, Oklahoma State University, and University of 
Southern California were implicated in an FBI investigation into bribes and 
other corruption in the sport.159  Rashan Michel, a former NBA referee, and 
Louis Martin Blazer III, an FBI cooperating witness, had an arrangement 
where Blazer would pay Michel on a monthly basis, and Michel would 
introduce Blazer to college coaches who were willing to accept bribes.160  In 
accordance with this arrangement, Michel introduced Blazer to Auburn’s 
assistant coach, Chuck Person.161  Blazer and Person met with an Auburn 
student-athlete to discuss a $15,000 bribe to induce the student-athlete to 
retain Blazer’s financial services.162  Person warned the player, “[t]he most 
important thing is that you . . . don’t say nothing to nobody . . . [b]ut don’t 
share with your sisters, don’t share with any of the teammates, that’s very 
important cause this is a violation . . . .”163  The FBI said Blazer paid Person 
a total of $91,500, which Person distributed among several of Auburn’s 
student-athletes and their families.164  Person was arrested on September 26, 
2017.165  His trial began on February 2019 in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York.166 
Another scandal uncovered during the investigation concerned Andre 
McGee, a former Louisville staff member, who allegedly arranged for strip 
dances and sex acts for three current student-athletes and fifteen recruits at a 
Louisville dormitory.167  Due to the scandal, on June 15, 2017, the NCAA 
suspended Rick Pitino, Louisville’s head coach, for five games, and vacated 
108 regular-season wins and fifteen NCAA tournament wins, including 
Louisville’s 2013 national championship win.168  Less than a month later, on 
July 10, a Louisville assistant coach spoke with Merl Code, an Adidas 
employee, and an undercover FBI agent about covering up Adidas’ $25,000 
payment to a father of a high school player who had recently committed to 
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Louisville.169  According to the complaint, James Gatto, Adidas’ head of 
sports marketing, had agreed to pay the recruit’s father a total of $100,000 at 
the request of a Louisville coach.170 
The FBI further alleged that undercover agents paid $20,000 in bribes 
to Arizona’s assistant coach, Emmanuel Richardson, and $13,000 in bribes 
to University of Southern California’s assistant coach, Tony Bland.171  
Further, James Gatto was further implicated in a few other schemes to pay 
recruits in order to induce them to commit to a particular university: 
$150,000 to a University of Miami recruit,172 $100,000 to a Louisville 
recruit, $90,000 to a University of Kansas recruit, and $20,000 to another 
University of Kansas recruit.173  On October 24, 2018, James Gatto and 
several others were found guilty on felony charges of wire fraud and 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.174  In a statement, U.S. Attorney Robert S. 
Khuzami said, “[t]oday’s convictions expose an underground culture of 
illicit payments, deception, and corruption in the world of college 
basketball . . . [t]hese defendants now stand convicted of not simply flouting 
the rules but breaking the law for their own personal gain.”175  Further, two 
additional federal criminal cases involving corruption in college basketball 
are scheduled for trial at the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in 2019.176  Arizona’s assistant coach Emanuel 
Richardson, Oklahoma State’s Lamont Evans, and USC’s Tony Bland are 
scheduled for trial in April.177 
Of course, college basketball is not the only collegiate sport to be 
plagued by corruption: college football has also dealt with corruption for 
decades.  Former sports agent, Josh Luchs, admitted that he illegally paid 
thirty college football players from 1990 to 1996.178  Luchs wrote an article 
about the “inner workings of an oily business” and showed how pervasive 
the illegal payments truly are.179  Further, in 2007, a sports marketer claimed 
that Reggie Bush received $280,000 in benefits while playing for USC’s 
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football team.180  In June 2010, the NCAA sanctioned USC by imposing a 
two-year bowl181 participation ban, and vacated fourteen football victories, 
including Reggie Bush’s Heisman award.182  Moreover, in 2011, five 
University of North Carolina football players were kicked off the team for 
accepting money from sports agents.183 
Corruption is endemic in college sports due in no small part to the 
NCAA’s insistence on amateurism.  If the NCAA cares about reforming this 
culture, its first step should be to drastically amend or eliminate its 
Amateurism Rule and to allow student athletes to be compensated.  The 
NCAA should allow student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and 
receive compensation for the use of their NILs, as this would avoid a myriad 
of legal issues and would bring the NCAA into compliance with the Sherman 
Act. 
 
A Practical Solution to the Problem: Allowing Student-Athletes 
to Accept Endorsement Deals and Receive Compensation  
for the Use of their NILs 
In order to eliminate the black market for student-athlete labor, 
something has to change.  “In the absence of free markets for college 
athletes’ services, darker and more dubious markets emerge that are an ideal 
breeding ground for unscrupulous individuals to engage in schemes to 
defraud college athletes and exploit their labor.”184 As discussed below, 
requiring the NCAA or colleges to directly pay student-athletes is 
impractical and creates legal difficulties.  But, allowing student-athletes to 
accept endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs 
would stem the corruption, while allowing the NCAA to avoid the 
entanglements of directly paying student-athletes.  Further, as mentioned in 
Part II of this Note, the NCAA wants its student-athletes to remain amateurs 
for two reasons: first, the NCAA presumes that amateurism is an integral 
part of the success and popularity of collegiate sports; and second, the NCAA 
asserts that being an amateur athlete allows students to get an education that 
they may not otherwise receive. 
 
 180.  Marketer claims Bush received $280K in benefits at USC, ESPN (Oct. 11, 2007), 
http://www.espn.com/college-football/news/story?id=3056397. 
 181.  “Bowls” are post-season college football games which teams qualify to play in.   
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https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-08-04-column04_ST1_N.htm# 
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 183.  Top 5 ‘pay to play’ scandals rocking college football, supra note 178.  
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As to the first point, this Note has already argued that fans are 
indifferent as to whether student-athletes get paid because most fans are 
primarily attracted to college sports for reasons unrelated to athletes’ amateur 
status, such as loyalty to their alma mater or affinity for the university near 
where they grew up.185  Furthermore, if consumers were not in favor of 
college athlete endorsements, then there would be no market for companies 
to hire college athletes as endorsers, because fans are the consumers of such 
endorsements.186  The market for endorsements already exists, but as 
presently constituted only benefits colleges and the NCAA. 
The culture of corruption in college athletics does nothing to bolster the 
integrity of college sports.  In fact, an argument can be made that the current 
system is actively undermining the public’s feelings toward college sports 
and toward the NCAA in particular.  Even prominent sports figures such as 
LeBron James have been outspoken about their dislike for the NCAA: “I’m 
not a fan of the NCAA . . . I’m not a fan of how the kids don’t benefit from 
none of this . . . .”187  Therefore, allowing student-athletes to receive 
compensation in the form of endorsement deals and the right to use their 
NILs would decrease the corruption while still preserving the success and 
popularity of college sports. 
Secondly, allowing student-athletes to accept endorsements and receive 
compensation for the use of their NILs would facilitate the NCAA’s goal of 
incentivizing education: student-athletes would likely stay in college longer 
if they were receiving compensation in some form.188  As discussed in Part 
II, many student-athletes leave college to join their sports’ professional draft 
once they are eligible; these athletes do so in many cases because they must.  
Allowing student-athletes to receive some compensation, even in the form 
of monetizing NILs, would help further the NCAA’s purported goal of 
supplying an education by enabling students to remain in school rather than 
creating incentives for athletes to bolt to the draft. 
Finally, as discussed below, allowing student-athletes to accept 
endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs is a 
more practical solution that the NCAA’s or individual university’s paying 
student-athletes because this practice would avoid legal issues including 
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 186.  Marc Edelman, 9 Reasons To Allow College Athletes To License Their Names, 
Images and Likeness, FORBES (May 11, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/si 
tes/marcedelman/2018/05/11/9-reasons-to-allow-college-athletes-to-license-their-names-
images-and-likenesses/#729dd2ca5488. 
 187.  Cuck Schilken, LeBron James is no fan of college basketball: ‘The NCAA is 
corrupt’, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsn 
ow/la-sp-lebron-james-ncaa-20180227-story.html. 
 188.  O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073. 
(2) CRISTIANI CLOSA NOTE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/1/2019  9:21 AM 
2020 CORRUPTION AND COLLEGE SPORTS 39 
Title IX violations, vicarious liability, and comply with the governing 
jurisprudent of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
Title IX, Employment Liability Considerations, and the Sherman Act 
Title IX states, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject 
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . .”189  At its inception the NCAA, which received 
federal financial assistance through the statute, contested Title IX’s 
application to college athletics.190  But in 1987, Congress amended the law 
to require Title IX to apply to all of an institution’s programs, including 
athletics that do not directly receive federal funds.191 
In Cohen v. Brown Univ.,192 the First Circuit held that a school must 
meet one of three requirements in order to comply with Title IX.193  First, 
schools may provide athletic participation opportunities for male and female 
students “in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective 
enrollments.”194  Second, if a gender is or has been underrepresented among 
student-athletes, the school may show that it has a continuing practice of 
striving for equal athletic opportunities between both genders.195  Finally, if 
a school cannot meet the first or second requirements, then it must 
demonstrate “that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have 
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.”196  In 
short, schools must provide female and male student-athletes equal athletic 
opportunities and must give equal treatment to both genders. 
If the Director of the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health 
and Human Services finds that a school which receives federal funds has 
discriminated against persons on the basis of their sex, the school “must take 
such remedial action as the Director deems necessary to overcome the effects 
of the discrimination.”197  Furthermore, violating Title IX leaves schools 
open to possible litigation from those discriminated against, which could end 
up costing the school a lot of money.  The National Center for Higher 
Education Risk Management has found that the average jury award in Title 
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IX cases is about $200,000.198  Some courts have awarded up to $4.52 million 
plus legal fees to Title IX plaintiffs.199  Therefore, a violation of Title IX 
could prove to be costly for schools. 
Requiring colleges to pay student-athletes directly would create Title 
IX problems, because colleges would be forced to give equal pay to all 
student-athletes.  Under Title IX, schools are already required to distribute 
athletic-based financial aid proportionally among female and male student-
athletes.200  Under current jurisprudence, therefore, schools would be 
required to give proportional pay to both female and male student-athletes.  
This would create financial problems for colleges and universities, because 
there would not be enough of a cash reservoir to pay all student-athletes 
equally while maintaining all athletic programs.201  Although Division I 
universities generate millions of dollars from their men’s football and 
basketball programs, universities use this money to fund other non-profitable 
sports, usually female sports.202  If universities were required to pay all 
student-athletes equally, universities would be forced to cut some of these 
non-profitable programs, which could cause a Title IX problem as equal 
opportunities would not be offered to both female and male student-athletes. 
Allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and receive 
compensation for the use of their NILs would not violate Title IX, because 
schools would not be paying student-athletes directly or indirectly.  “The 
endorsement plan does not create an environment where schools treat 
women’s sports unfairly because it does not require schools to compensate 
athletes unequally, as the endorsement plan excludes participation of 
schools.”203  Furthermore, by allowing student-athletes to accept 
endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs, the 
NCAA is creating equal opportunities for both genders as female and male 
student-athletes would be able to accept endorsement deals and receive 
compensation for the use of their NILs.  “Because it’s a plan that would allow 
notable student-athletes to essentially get whatever somebody believes 
 
 198.  Robin Hattersley-Gray, Not Complying with Title IX Could Cost You, CAMPUS 
SAFETY (June 3, 2012), https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/university/not-complying-
with-title-ix-could-cost-you/. 
 199.  Brian L. Porto, Halfway Home: An Update on Title IX and College Sports, 34-SUM 
VT. B.J. 28, 32 (2008).  
 200.  Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications of Northwestern and 
O’Bannon, supra note 190 at 324. 
 201.  Michael A. Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A 
Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created By Unethical Sports Agents 
and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 407-08 
(2012). 
 202.  Id. at 406.  
 203.  Id. at 420.  
(2) CRISTIANI CLOSA NOTE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/1/2019  9:21 AM 
2020 CORRUPTION AND COLLEGE SPORTS 41 
they’re worth, and it would neither be a financial strain on universities nor a 
Title IX nightmare.”204 
In addition to complying with Title IX, allowing student-athletes to 
accept endorsement deals and receive compensation for the use of their NILs 
also protects universities from being vicariously liable for their student-
athletes’ actions.  The doctrine of respondeat superior states that an 
employer is subject to liability (i.e. vicariously liable) for the acts of his 
employees committed while acting in the scope of their employment.205  An 
employee is defined as: “[s]omeone who works in the service of another 
person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under 
which the employer has the right to control the details of work 
performance.”206  Scope of employment is defined as: “[t]he range of 
reasonable and foreseeable activities that an employee engages in while 
carrying out the employer’s business . . . .”207  An employer is not 
vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee acting outside the 
scope of employment, unless the employer was negligent or reckless.208  An 
employer is, however, liable for torts committed by an employee acting 
within the scope of their employment.209  Moreover, an employer is liable on 
a contract between their employee and a third party when the employee acts 
with actual, apparent, or inherent authority.210 
If student-athletes receive a salary from their colleges or from the 
NCAA, they will likely be classified as employees of the school.  This means 
that, within certain parameters, a school or the NCAA may be liable for the 
student-athlete’s actions.  This potential liability is understandably a 
frightening prospect for schools and the NCAA, given patterns of student-
athlete misbehavior.  For example, an ex-Duke University basketball player 
is being accused of sexual assault, which allegedly occurred in 1999 while 
the player was a student there.211  If this player was paid by and therefore 
considered an employee of Duke, and committed torts considered within the 
scope of his employment or the university was found to be negligent, then 
the university could be vicariously liable for this student-athlete’s actions.  
 
 204.  Gary Parrish, Everybody wins if the NCAA will allow players to accept 
endorsements, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:28 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
basketball/news/everybody-wins-if-the-ncaa-will-allow-players-to-accept-endorsements/. 
 205.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219.  
 206.  Employee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 207.  Scope of Employment, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
 208.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219. 
 209.  Id.  
 210.  Id. § 140.  
 211.  A.J. Perez, Coach K says he had ‘no knowledge’ of alleged 1999 sexual assault 
linked to Duke player, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2019, 10:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/sports/ncaab/2019/02/09/duke-mike-krzyzewski-no-knowledge-ex-player-rape-allegat 
ion/2827702002/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
(2) CRISTIANI CLOSA NOTE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELECT) 11/1/2019  9:21 AM 
42 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 42.1 
This means the university could face timely and costly legal proceedings.  It 
is not difficult to imagine a situation where a student-athlete commits a 
criminal or civil infraction on a team road trip or at a team party.  These kinds 
of stories happen often, and it’s important to shield colleges from this type 
of liability. 
Allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and receive 
compensation for the use of their NILs would circumvent the problem of 
vicarious liability.  Further, as student-athletes would not be considered 
employees of their schools, “colleges and universities would avoid any type 
of workers’ compensation payments or collective bargaining agreements that 
could arise if the student-athletes were wage earners.”212 
Lastly, allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and 
receive compensation for the use of their NILs would likely comply with the 
current section 1 of the Sherman Act jurisprudence.  The court in O’Bannon 
reasoned that amateurism is a legitimate procompetitive purpose and that is 
why the NCAA’s current anti-compensation rules do not violate the Sherman 
Act.213  The proposed solution would virtually eliminate the NCAA’s 
Amateurism Rule because student-athletes would receive “pay” which rids 
them of their amateur status.  Nevertheless, the NCAA would be in 
compliance with the Sherman Act because it would no longer be restraining 
trade.  Under its current rules, the NCAA is restraining trade because it does 
not allow student-athletes to be compensated for their labor.  Therefore, if 
the NCAA allowed student-athletes to be compensated, it would no longer 




NCAA’s Amateurism Rule has a long, complicated history.  The 
NCAA firmly believes that its student-athletes should remain amateurs, and 
while that made sense thirty years ago, it does not make sense now.  Last 
year alone, the NCAA made a billion dollars in revenue, and none of it went 
directly to the student-athletes whose labor made the money.214  Corruption 
has ensued at colleges and universities due to the NCAA’s persistence that 
its student-athletes remain amateurs.  The NCAA argues that if it eliminates 
its Amateurism Rule, fans will lose interest in college sports.215  Arguably, 
however, the ongoing corruption and scandals are already damaging the 
integrity of college sports.  Therefore, the best solution to all involved would 
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be for the NCAA to allow student-athletes to accept endorsement deals and 
receive compensation for the use of their NILs. 
Moreover, the NCAA once again finds itself in litigation (In Re: Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletics Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation216) 
defending against antitrust challenges to its compensation rules.  The 
plaintiff student-athletes are arguing that limiting their compensation 
prevents colleges from competing against one another.217  On March 8, 2019, 
Judge Wilken, applying the antitrust rule of reason analysis, found that the 
challenged practices did have significant anticompetitive effects because 
greater compensation would be offered in the recruitment of student-athletes 
but for these restrictions.218  Many people argue that the court’s holding in 
O’Bannon precludes student-athletes from receiving compensation for the 
use of their NILs.  However, O’Bannon does not present a hurdle for this 
litigation or congressional action: 
 
The O’Bannon case did not implement an outright ban of 
compensation beyond a full scholarship, and it misapplied the 
Rule of Reason balancing test. Although the Supreme Court has 
not accepted an appeal, this case would neither prohibit a future 
ruling in favor of an amendment to the NCAA’s amateurism 
regulation, nor would it place any burden on Congress should 
Congress decide to implement a bill that amended the 
regulation.219 
 
On March 22, 2019, the NCAA filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit.220  This allows the Ninth Circuit to revisit its ruling in O’Bannon 
and, hopefully, hold that the NCAA is violating section 1 of the Sherman 
Act by restricting compensation. 
Nevertheless, on September 11, 2019, the California legislature passed 
Senate Bill 206, which allows California universities to compensate student-
athletes for the use of the NILs.221  The NCAA sent Governor Gavin Newsom 
a letter stating that this bill “would wipe out the distinction between college 
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and professional sports . . . .”222  While California schools are not required to 
compensate student-athletes for the use of their NILs under Senate Bill 206, 
this new development definitely puts pressure on the NCAA to reconsider 
their Amateurism Rule. 
In a shocking turn of events, on October 29, 2019, the NCAA’s Board 
of Governors unanimously voted to permit student-athletes to profit from the 
use of their NILs.223  While the NCAA has not stated how this will function 
with its current Amateurism Rule, NCAA President Mark Emmert stated that 
student-athletes will remain “students and not professionals.”224  Therefore, 
it is likely the NCAA will retain its Amateurism Rule and simply state that 
compensation based on the use of student-athletes’ NILs is no longer 
considered pay under its compensation rules.  As stated earlier, the NCAA 
has changed what is considered “pay” in the past without abolishing its 
Amateurism Rule (e.g. student-athletes were not allowed to receive 
scholarships because it was considered “pay”).225  However, as long as the 
NCAA keeps its Amateurism Rule, courts will continue to allow it to hide 
behind the rule when faced with future antitrust challenges.  As such, while 
this is definitely a step in the right direction, the NCAA has to get rid of its 
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